A. Introduction
The central theme o f this series of lectures implies th a t man -and then especially m odern m an, w ho provokes our concern -is an endangered being and th at the Christian has a reply to this threat.
I have been accorded the signal honour of being asked to evaluate the problem from the point o f view of the Law. 1 w ould like to extend my cordial appreciation to the PU for CHE for this invitation.
There can be no d o ubt as far as the first im plication goes, which is that man is an endangered being.
The second im plication, which claims that the Christian always has an answer, is more problem atic, especially if one looks at the central them e from the point of view of Law.
Should one approach the question from a juridical viewpoint it would seem th a t there are three questions in particular deserving of atten tio n , viz. (a) Can the Law constitute a threat to man? (b) Can the legal order becom e the subject m atter of a threat leading to a th reat to man as encom passed w ithin the legal ord rr? (c) Can the Law assume the function of p rotecto r of man against the treat?
A ttention should thus be directed at the possibility of: (i) the law as the threatening force; (ii) the law as the threatened entity; and (lii) the law as a p ro tec to r o f man in the face of the threat.
In each instance an effort has to be made to determ ine the Christian point of view with regard to the m atter under consideration.
* Translation from the original Afrikaans lecture.
B. The law as the threatening force
The question to be evaluated here is w hether it is possible to abuse the law to such an extent that it constitutes a threat to m ankind, l-.xprcsscd dif ferently: can the law be used as a means of com m itting an injustice?
There can be no doubt th a t state authorities sometimes com m it injustices in the nam e of the law. Some biblical scribes apparently already struggled with this evil, as emerges from the following: Proverbs 16:12: It is an abom ination of kings to com m it wickedness... D euteronom y 16:19: Thou shalt not wrest judgem ent... Psalm 9 4:20: Shall the throne of iniquity have fellowship with thee, which fram eth mischief by a law? Proverbs 18:5: It is not good to accept the person of the w icked, to over throw the righteous in judgm ent. Isaiah 5:22-23: Woe unto them ... which justify the w icked for rew ard, and take away the righteousness of the righteous from him! In ordinary parlance one speaks in such cases o f " ty ran n y " , "fo rce" , or "suppression" .
A state authority (including the judiciary which is p art of the state authority) which is guilty of such action abuses its own function and thus its own nature. W hat then would constitute the function of the state au th o rity from the scriptural point o f view?
It rests on (a) m aintaining the state and society (cf .Proverbs 29:4: "The king by judg m ent establisheth the land..."); (b) p rotecting and cherishing the cou ntry (cf. Psalm 78:7: " He chose Dawid also his servant, and took him from the sheepfolds... to feed Jaco b his p eo ple, and Israel his inheritance" ); (c) com bating evil in society (cf. Romans 13:4: " For he is the m inister of God to thee for good. But if th o u do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth n o t the sword in vain..."); (d) reconciling the interests o f subject and ruler in such a way th a t justice may prevail (cf. Psalm 82:3): " Defend the poor and fatherless: do justice to the afflicted and need y " ; D eut. 16:20: "T hat w hich is altogether just shalt thou follow " ).
As stated already, a state auth o rity which com m its ty ranny abuses its own function and intrinsic n ature. From a legal philosophical p o in t o f view the question arises as to w hether man is still dealing w ith true law when the legal norm itself becom es the instrum ent of injustice. This can be answered in m ore than one way depending on the school of thought to which one b e longs (which schools cannot be considered w ithin the scope of this paper). W hether man in such a situation is dealing with defective law or sanctioned injustice is n o t the po in t -m a n 's existence is threatened by these measures o f au tho rity. T he fact also remains th a t these prescriptions of authority function in the name of the law and even should this be not true law, it still brings the law into disrepute.
Exam ples from the Scriptures are the following: (i) P haraoh's com m and to kill the Hebrew boys (Exodus 1:16); (ii) D arius' com m and th a t only the king may be petitioned in prayer for th irty days (Daniel 6:7-11); (iii) H erod's infanticide (M atthew 2 :16).
Well-known examples from the tw entieth century are (i) the Nazi prescriptions according to which many people were executed because of their belonging to a particular race; and (ii) the laws of President Amin of Uganda which robbed many Indians of their possessions and which led to their deportation.
The above are extrem e examples and nobody except wilful enemies could suggest th a t such governm ent prescriptions exist in South Africa, yet every Christian who wishes to adhere to the Scriptural prescription of seek ing out justice should continually reflect critically on w hether all govern m ent prescriptions answer to the dem ands of justice. Those laws specifically which condone extended detention w ithout trial present problem s to the Christian conscience.
C. The law as the threatened entity
The times in which we live have indicated th at the legal order itself is threatened at times.
Some examples: (a) Some years ago a group of Palestinian terrorists launched a m urderous attack on Israel athletes at the Munich Olympics. They were arrested but not punished. Why not? (b) T he internal wing of Swapo conspires with the external wing to com m it m urder. Many m urders are in fact com m itted. Why a re n 't the leaders prose cuted in the criminal courts on the basis o f com m on purpose? Would the reason be th at a conspiracy cannot be proved or that the authorities shy away from th e international storm th a t this would create? (c) Russia invades Hungary. Cam bodia succumbs to the Vietnamese onslaught. The Security Council of the U .N . which is supposed to m onitor the rights of nations allows this openly.
In all these instances one com m on elem ent is to be found: the principles of sound adm inistration o f justice are being eroded by the political on slaughts of the tw entieth century. And ordinary man is threatened because o f this -n o t merely threatened, often destroyed.
What would be the answer of the Christian to this threat? The powers in volved here are so ferocious th a t the Christian's only recourse is to the hum blest o f prayers: " Deliver us from evil..." .
D. The law as a protective force against this th reat
It is the natural function o f the law, as far as it may be able to do so, to p ro tec t man against these threats. This appears clearly from the following obvious examples: * man is threatened by his grasping nature: for th a t reason the law makes provision against crimes such as th e ft, ro bbery, blackm ail, fraud and gambling; * man is threatened by his violent nature -therefore m urder and assault are punishable offences; * man is threatened by his carnal urges -thus rape, incest and certain other forms o f im m orality are branded as criminal.
At first glance the fact th a t the law accords one p ro tectio n in the above instances does n ot create problem s for th e Christian. The legal rules prohibiting the commission of the above crimes are in accord w ith the Scriptural dem and th a t the governm ent should bear the sword " to execute w rath upon him th a t doeth evil" (Romans 13:4). But as soon as one reflects upon the fact th a t m urder, rape and armed robbery can be visited by the death penalty the m atter assumes a problem atic nature. Would all Christians agree th a t there is a Christian foundation underlying the legal rules allowing the death penalty for arm ed robbery? What should a Christian legislature be in response to th e rapist and th e armed robber? Should he accede th at the crim inal's life may be taken in the case where th e crime was com m itted in aggravating circum stances? May the legislature unlim itedly extend the num ber of cases entailing the death penalty, going to the extrem e of, for exam ple, em ploying the death penalty as a means to conserve petrol? Where should the line be drawn?
In the abovem entioned examples the Christian should experience no dif ficulty in assessing the need for com bating the relevant th reat by the en actm ent and application o f legal measures. The problem is rath er w hether th e way in which th e law seeks to guard against the threat is founded on Christian principles.
'['he case just m entioned, however, is not the onl i one in which the Christian may entertain a doubt as to how far he may legally go to avert the threat. 1 intend therefore to focus on tw o problem areas by way of example.
The first problem area to be focussed on deals with abortion*). It is a well-known fact th a t there are a disquietingly high num ber of backstreet abortions in South Africa every year as a result of undesired preg nancies. A com prehensive sociological survey w ould be needed to establish the reasons underlying this situation. Although I do not pretend to be a so ciologist, I would guess th at the following factors play a role: * so-called liberal attitudes tow ards extra-m arital sexual relations; * inability or unwillingness to assume the responsibility for parenthood; * the belief (a corollary o f the existentialist world view) th at man has the inalienable right to determ ine his own destiny, which contributes to the idea that the pregnant woman would have the inalienable right to decide for her self w hether or not to term inate her pregnancy.
Whatever the underlying causes may be, however, one has to face the fact th a t the situation exists. Should one accept th a t the unborn foetus is "a h u man being in his pre-natal existence" , then one is, u n d o ubtedly, dealing in this case with a very serious threat against man -in his pre-natal existence. How should this threat be averted?
The ideal solution would be to avoid undesired pregnancies. This, how ever, is an ideal th a t cannot be realized, and therefore the legal order has to find an alternative solution. G enerally speaking the threat is com batted legally by proclaim ing abortion to be a crime. But, as will be seen, the legislature has allowed certain exceptions.
In the light of this situation certain points affecting principle arise: (a) Should the principle allowing exceptions be subscribed to at all? In other words: is it possible to visualise circum stances in which th e deliberate killing of an unborn foetus may be allowed on principle? (b) Should the principle o f allowing exceptions be granted the right of exist ence: w hat exceptions should be allowed? * Should one accede to pleas from those wishing to com bat backstreet abortions by increasing the num ber of legalized abortions? (It is well-known th a t the view point is sometim es advocated th a t abortion-on-dem and should be allowed.) * Is the present legal situation with regard to abortion n o t already in conflict with Christian principles?
In order to see all this in true perspective we should look briefly at the present state of affairs regarding abortion legislation:
In accordance w ith the A bortion and Sterilization A ct. 1975, a legal abortion may be perform ed in the following circum stances: where a co n tinued pregnancy will endanger the life of the w om an; where a continued pregnancy constitutes a serious threat to the w om an's physical or m ental health or where there is a serious risk th a t the child may suffer from a serious physical or m ental defect of such a nature th a t he will be irreparably handicapped; where the pregnancy is the result of rape, incest or unlawful carnal intercourse with a female idiot or imbecile in contravention of section 15 o f the Im m orality Act, 1957. (In passing it might be m entioned th at the statute em bodies several provisions which have to be com plied with before an abortion may be perform ed, b u t these are left out of considera tion here as they are n ot crucial to the m atter.)^)
Before this statu te was prom ulgated abortion was perm itted only in cases where a continued pregnancy endangered th e w om an's life-*). The statute under consideration has thus considerably extended the scope of legalized abortion.
The question now facing the Christian is w hether or n o t this extension represents a step in the right direction. Has the legislature in conflict with Christian principles intensified the onslaught on man in his pre-natal exist ence or has it done th at which can be justified on Christian principles? These questions cannot be dealt with adequately unless one ascertains what 2) For a discussion of the statute under consideration, cf. J.C. Stassen, "Die Wet op vruRafdrywinR en stcrilisasic, 2 van 1975", Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrihaanse Reg, 1976, pp. 260 ff. 3) For a discussion of the law as it was before the promulgation of the statute in quest ion, cf. S.A. Strauss, "Abortion and the I.aw in South Africa, The Great Debate, pp. 1 25 If.
an unborn em bryo essentially is. Should it be regarded as a potential human being who should then be treated as such in the juridical, ethical and reli gious spheres? Or should it be regarded as som ething essentially and radical ly differen t from m an, with the result th a t it may be treated in a radically d ifferen t way? Is the deliberate killing of an em bryo (except in a case where a w om an's life or condition of health is seriously endangered) m urder or principle? Should Genesis 9:6 be applicable to an em bryo? ("Whoso sheddeth m an 's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God m ade he m a n .") Should the em bryo therefore already be regarded as being in the image of God?
This question may be further elucidated as follows: no reasonable hum an being would even consider condoning the m urder of a child concerned in rape or incest. The existing law, how ever, allows the ab ortion of an em bryo thus begotten, w ith the proviso th a t the w om an's life or physical or m ental health be in danger. Similarly no Christian would advocate the killing of a child who is seriously and incurably physically or m entally retarded -yet th e em bryo may be aborted should there may be a serious danger o f such defectiveness.
The underlying prem ise w ould seem to be that the em bryo is som ething fundam entally d ifferen t from a hum an being, so th at the legislature is free to determ ine for itself the circum stances in which an em bryo may be a b o rt ed.
The question rem ains, how ever, w hether this viewpoint is defensible on principle.
For interest's sake one might m ention here Prof. J.A . H eyns' viewpoint as expressed in his book Die N uw e Mens onderw eg^). lie says (in translated form ) th at " Whoever destroys developing life, according to Barth, kills a hum an being. As soon as conception has taken place, we are dealing with a hum an life however incom plete and undeveloped il might be -a human being created by G od in His ow n image. To my mind there can be only tw o exceptions: where life confronts life and either m other or baby (or both) would seem to be in m ortal danger, a choice will have to be made. But it would not seem to be m orally and religiously justifiable to prejudge the 4) I aftllx-r»; Publishers, Cape Town, 1 970, pp. I X I -1 R2.
issue and decichs in all cases to save the life o f either the m o th er or child. The choice has to be left open-ended as circum stances might determ ine which of the tw o should be saved. The second exception concerns rape. Here it does n o t concern an unexpected child, or an unw anted child, b ut one th a t has been forced on to one, the legacy of a feared and abhorred in truder. Such an event would be enough to scar the m other em otionally and physically for the rest of her life"®).
In a case o f rape, where there is a real danger of "perm anent physical or em otional scarring" one might agree th a t abortion might be allowed on the basis o f a crisis situation. But this is n ot necessarily the case. Would it, on principle, also be permissible to destroy th e foetus in cases where the w om an might n o t be physically or em otionally seriously affected by the continuing pregnancy? Should we accept th a t "as soon as conception has taken place... we are dealing with a human being... created by and in the image of G o d " , then it seems unclear to me th a t it w ould be permissible to kill purely because it was " forced " on a woman.
A part from these reservations regarding Prof. H eyns' views it is to be pointed o u t th a t the statute under consideration sanctions abortions n o t covered by him , such as in the case where it can reasonably be expected th at the child will be seriously retarded®), or where the pregnancy was the result o f inrest. The question now arises as to w hether there are un-Christian elem ents in a statute passed by Christian Members of Parliam ent.
Suppose for the m om ent th a t an unborn em bryo/foetus is something radically different from a hum an being while it is still n o t viable -in other w ords, th a t a t this stage it is merely an appendage o f the m o th er's body. Yet the statute in question makes no distinction betw een a viable and a nonviable foetus -an unborn foetus of eight m onths conceived after rape or in cest may legally be ab orted should the m o ther decide n ot to continue the pregnancy. The provision as to incest also creates a problem . Incest may be com m itted by two people n o t related by blood and who have a relationship, such as betw een man and the grown daughter o f his divorced wife. To perm it abortion in such a case is highly problem atic. Against this background the problem may be recapitulated as follows: (a) A th reat to man in the pre-natal state does exist. (b) T he legal order com bats this threat by rendering abortion a crim inal act apart from certain exceptional cases. (c) There are thus exceptional cases where abortion is sanctioned by law. (d) T he question arises on the one hand as to w hether these can be justified on Christian principles. (e) On the other hand the question arises as to w hether these exceptions can be extended w ith due reference to the said principles.
In conclusion the question can be posed as to w hether the Christian has a clear solution to the problem o f undesired pregnancy which results in a threat to " man in his pre-natal existence" .
Subsequently, attention will be directed briefly on the one hand at the th reat inherent in hum an suffering and on the other hand at the threat posed by a highly developed medical science and technology. The co m bined effect o f these tw o threats is the problem of euthanasia.
(i) The threat o f suffering
T hat man is exposed to terrible suffering is no secret. Should this suf fering be accom panied by an incurable disease and the position is one of ir revocable deterioration, the question arises as to w hether euthanasia would not be justified. We all know th at this cause has support from tim e to time. In this vein a certain Edgar Hill w rote in the Eastern Province Herald on February 24, 1979, under the heading "Ticklish Subject for a Saturday M orning" : "W hat I do suggest, is th at any m an, provided he is com pos m entis, should have the right in certain extrem e circum stances, to request th at his life be term inated, and if he be non com pos m entis, that two d octors, of w hom one should be preferably his own personal physician, be given the 7) Cf. KJ. van Zyl, quoted article, pp. 218 ff.
right to accord him the mercy of a 'good d ea th '
In this respect one can also refer to the viewpoint expressed by Prof. Chris Barnard recently in the USA Evening Post of July 17, 1978: "He believes the law will someday change and doctors will be perm itted to stop treatm ent when the treatm ent serves only one purpose -and th a t is to prolong the suffering of the p a tie n t'."
In America the situation already exists where a judge may perm it eu th a nasia. According to the Evening Post of July 17, 1978 a judge in Florida de cided " th at an elderly, terminally-ill patient had the right to die by asking for his life-support machine to be switched o ff" . In another recent news re p o rt from Los Angeles we read:
"While his parents sat by his side, a three-year-old boy died to d ay , just 17 m inutes after a doctor switched off his life-saving respirator. A judge, a t the wish of the parents of the boy, identified only as Benjamin C. had a short time earlier signed a court order authorising doctors to pull out the plug of the m achine. Benjamin had been in a coma since he was injured in a car accident three m onths ago. Doctors said he had irreversible, braindam age" .
What should the response of the Christian legislature be to this threat of pain and suffering?
It is well-known th a t a certain Dr H artm an was found guilty of m urder in the Supreme Court in 1975. M otivated by pity he had term inated the life of his father who was critically ill®). He was sentenced to one y ea r's im prisonm ent suspended for one year on condition th at he did not in th at year com m it an offence involving the intentional infliction of bodily injury. He was detained merely until the court adjourned.
This co u rt case highlighted problem s surrounding euthanasia. The judge referred to this issue by saying th at "at this stage the patient presented a problem to his medical attend ant which brings about a conflict in ethical principles, namely to save life and to relieve pain and suffering. The magni tude of this conflict varies naturally with the circumstances of the case" .
From the c o u rt's finding it appears th a t the infliction of euthanasia is, according to our law, technically and on principle m urder b u t th at the p u nishm ent is often relatively light as a result of the extenuating circum stances m otivating the deed.
Ju d g ed from th e view point o f Christian ethics it w ould seem to me th a t the legal position should be supported. It is hard to accept th a t Christian ethics w ould sanction the killing o f an incurably ill person o u t o f p ity^).
(it) The threat p resented by highly-developed m edical science and techno logy
Should one approach the m atter from this angle, th e problem s prolife rate. Medical science and technology are able now adays to keep a person alive artificially for a long tim e. In some cases the p a tie n t's death is p o st p oned in a way th a t cannot be sanctioned by Christian m orality, as one can describe this process as nothing o th e r th an cruelty at tim es. Is this n o t an in fringem ent o f m an 's inalienable right to die in peace?
In this respect D r D.H. B randt w rites th e following (in translated form ) in his article " B randpunte b etreffen d e sekere medies-etiese p ro b lem e"^®): " A dded to this one may n o t intensify or prolong th e suffering o f y o u r neighbour. Because one does n o t wish to have this done to oneself, one should n o t inflict this on an o th er, as one should love o n e's neighbour as oneself. Can th e d o cto r n o t aggravate th e suffering and grief of his neigh b o u r by over-enthusiastically applying m edicines, and also bring grief to the relatives? U ndoubtedly he can do th is" * 9) C.F. Heynj, quoted work, pp. 180-181. . By means of several illustrative examples he points out that this "constitution" has led to very undesirable practices in our day and age and that under certain conditions the doctor should allow a patient to die. Heyns (quoted work, p. 187, n. 62) disputes Van den Berg's view that the foun dation of medical ethics (conservation and prolongation of life) should have signifi cance in these days only where prolongation makes sense. To my mind the question to be answered is not whether or not the prolongation of the patient's life makes sense. How can one individual decide on the significance or otherwise of another's life? The question should rather centre on whether prolongation may be undertaken in a way which will expose the patient cruelly to pain and suffering.
We have to accept th a t Christian m orality prohibits the cruel prolonga tion o f suffering. The question now arises as to w hether the principles of unauthorised euthanasia and of authorised non-prolongation of suffering can always be distinguished. The answer would seem to be negative. Sup pose th a t -as in the case of Benjamin above -a person has been injured in a car accident, incurring such serious brain injury th a t he cannot, m edi cally speaking, recover, th a t he suffers grievously and th a t he can be kept alive only through intravenous feeding and oxygen. Suppose further th a t a nurse in com m and of the ward interrupts the oxygen supply so th at the p a tient dies. Has the patient been m urdered or is one dealing in such a case w ith a principle of authorized non-prolongation o f suffering? Superficially one could say th at he has been m urdered because (so one could reason) the nurse has term inated the p a tie n t's life through a positive action. Sup pose however th a t the nurse merely refrained from providing for a new oxy gen supply after the previous one had been exhausted. In the latter case, one might argue, the nurse has done nothing positive to term inate the p a tie n t's life b u t merely failed to prolong agony. And yet it is clear th a t in both instances th e nurse has acted on essentially the same principle: she exercised her control over th e patient in such a way as to cause his death deliberate ly.
It thus appears th at the dividing line betw een morally forbidden eu thana sia and morally permissible non-prolongation of suffering should n o t be sought in the difference betw een so-called positive and negative euthanasia. It is conceivable th a t even in the case of sanctioned non-prolongation of suffering a positive action has to be taken, viz. the cessation of adm inistra tion o f life -s u p p o rt^). There can be no question th a t the Christian d octor 12) According to Brandt, quoted article, p. 7, "Still more difficult is the decision as to whether supporting means or aids which have already been supplied and which may in all probability have contributed materially to the prolongation of life, should be discontinued. Such discontinuation may constitute positive action. This has to be dis tinguished, however, from positive action accompanied by the administering of a speci fic substance(s) to induce death quickly. The mere cessation of life-supporting sub stances would not deprive the patient of an opportunity to live were his earthly span not completed. This observation refers only to those patients who cannot return to normal by the administering of these substances... The cessation of therapy which will unnecessarily prolong the agony of the patient seems to be justified". It would seem as if Or Brandt is looking for the dividing line between forbidden euthanasia and permis sible non-prolongation of agony in the answer to the question as to whether or not w ho is involved in such a situation is in a serious dilemma. On the one hand he has to obey the com m andm ent prohibiting killing while on the other hand he has to obey the com m andm ent to love his neighbour and n ot to in flict needless cruelty.
Is it fair to leave it to the do cto r to decide every time which of these principles he is dealing with and to expose himself at the same tim e to the risk o f criminal prosecution as a result of our uncertain laws in this respect? Should Christians who are in a position to exert an influence on legislation not also work tow ards establishing d e a r guidelines betw een permissible and forbidden actions? If so: w hat should the reply o f the Christian legislature be to the threat of pain and suffering on the one hand and the threat posed by a highly-developed medical science and technology on the other hand?
I leave this question to you. It w ould appear from the foregoing examples th a t there are threats for which the Christian jurist and Christian governm ent have n ot yet developed final counters. Has the tim e not arrived to start a serious quest for answers? Or will the Christian procrastinate until answers are supplied from hum anist sources?
In conclusion I w ould like to refer very briefly to some threats posed by the hum anist world view as regards the adm inistration of law: (a) There can be no doubt abou t the fact that the existentialist world view according to which man has an absolute • right of choice has an enorm ous influence on literature. The existentialist w riter claims for himself the right to write about everything even should this shock my and your religious sen sibilities or offend against our sense of propriety. The legislature has sought to avert this threat by prom ulgating the Publications A ct, 1974. (b) The Marxist world view threatens or endangers our governm ental in stitu tions. The legislature has countered these threats by prom ulgating the man's earthly span has elapsed. Should the answer be affirmative, the administering of supportive substances may be terminated -not otherwise. The problem with this argument is that it is not always clear when one's earthly span has ended. Does it not perhaps include the time during which one may live only with medical aid? Cf. further: C. van'der Meer, Geneesk.und.ige Confrontatie met dc Dood, Staflcu's Wetenschappelijke Uitgewersmaatschappij, N.V. Leiden, pp. 23-24: "I am of the opinion that it is not the duty of the physician to support unendurable agony. When he is convinced personally of the inevitability of the patient's death and the intensity of his agony, then it is his duty, preferably in consultation with an uninvolved physician, to cease all therapy not aimed at relieving agony". (d) The existentialist world view has becom e a threat to married life. At the m om ent a bill is being considered in Parliament which will p u t divorce laws on a com pletely different footing. This bill encompasses the principle that a court may dissolve a marriage should it seem th a t there is no reasonable chance of reconciliation.
While these laws should be regarded as an effort to com bat evil, the Christian should ensure the safety of both himself and his descendants against these threats according to the principle expressed in D euteronom y 6:6-7: " And these words, which I com m and thee this day, shall be in thine heart: And thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest dow n, and when thou risest u p " .
The concern here is with the Christian principle of education which was acknowledged by the legislature in the Act on National Educational Policy in 1967, and the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (Private) Act 1950.
May this University continue in its great task of reinforcing Christian principles in young people privileged to study here. * *
